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PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS AND MEETING THE
DUDENHOEFFER PLEADING STANDARD
DOUGLASS G. BROWN*

ABSTRACT
This Comment analyzes the recent Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) stock drop cases against The Boeing
Company (Boeing) and reviews the underlying pleading standard in these cases that the Supreme Court set forth in Fifth
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. With the tremendous amount of
assets in retirement plans—and specifically in employee stock
ownership plans—litigation under ERISA can be extremely
costly to employers, especially those in the airline industry that
offer these plans. The current pleading standard for stock drop
cases has become a practically insurmountable barrier to plaintiffs, even when their employers know they are negligently creating products that cause serious harm. When these stock drop
cases are brought in court, plaintiffs must allege alternative actions that “no prudent fiduciary” could have decided would have
done more harm than good for the employer.
However, this alternative action requirement does not consider the industry type or the underlying cause of harm the employer has potentially caused. This Comment asserts that courts
undergo a context-specific analysis and factor in the public
health considerations and devastating harm that some products
can have on the broader community. While many employers
may have concerns that this factor may be difficult to weigh,
plaintiffs must still overcome a high bar to bring these cases.
Plaintiffs must continue to allege that the employer acted negligently in violating the underlying industry’s safety statutes or
other standards. Additionally, among the contested duties of the
employer is the scope of liability when it appoints a third-party
investment fiduciary. This Comment then asserts that employers
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2022; B.B.A. Finance, Texas
A&M University, 2010.
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should be required to inform appointed investment fiduciaries
as a part of their ongoing duty to monitor investments in their
employee stock ownership plans.
This Comment takes these considerations and proposes
weighing public safety in the alternative action pleading requirements outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court. First, the Boeing
737 Max crashes are summarized, and the subsequent ERISA litigation is analyzed. Next, this Comment discusses fiduciary duties under ERISA and the evolution of the pleading standards in
stock drop cases, including how this standard has been applied
in various circuits around the United States. Finally, the public
safety factor is scrutinized and shown how it can be assessed: no
prudent fiduciary could conclude that corrective disclosure
would potentially do more harm than good when public safety is
a major risk factor. This would prove to be a more equitable
standard consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent precedent requiring context-specific inquiries into ERISA claims,
while still protecting employers from frivolous lawsuits.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Let’s just say . . . the market price is four times more than the
actual value, and the fiduciaries know that because of inside information that they have. It just sort of defies language to say
that . . . a prudent person would retain the investment in that
kind of wildly overvalued stock, doesn’t it? – Justice Elena Kagan1

Retirement plans account for a vast majority of wealth and
investments in America, encompassing trillions of dollars.2 Consequently, these plans are a prime source for litigation as the
employers’ deep pockets usually fund them. Of the Fortune 500
companies in 2019, 430 offered defined contribution plans, 57
offered hybrid pension plans, and 13 offered traditionally defined benefit plans.3 A subset of this massive web of plans is the
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), where employees can
invest (through their benefit plan) directly in their own employer’s stock.4 As of December 2021, 6,482 ESOPs were offered
in the United States, covering just under 14 million participants
and managing just over $1.67 trillion in assets.5 Furthermore,
defined contribution plans themselves can involve employer
stock as an investment option.6 Management is especially impor1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer,
573 U.S. 409 (2014) (No. 12-751), 2014 WL 1313775, at *10.
2 Press Release, Willis Towers Watson, Global Top 20 Pension Fund Assets Rebound Strongly, (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.wtwco.com/en-US/News/2020/
09/global-top-20-pension-fund-assets-rebound-strongly [https://perma.cc/6BZK4VG7] (“Assets under management (AUM) at the world’s 300 largest pension
funds increased in value by 8.0% to a total of $19.5 trillion in 2019 . . .”).
3 Brendan McFarland, Retirement Offerings in the Fortune 500: 1998–2019, WILLIS
TOWERS WATSON (June 25, 2020), https://www.wtwco.com/en-US/Insights/
2020/06/retirement-offerings-in-the-fortune-500-1998-2019 [https://perma.cc/
8C5K-4NSR].
4 How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP.
OWNERSHIP (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nceo.org/articles/esop-employeestock-ownership-plan [https://perma.cc/ABM6-VVZV].
5 Employee Ownership by the Numbers, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP (Mar.
2021), https://www.nceo.org/articles/employee-ownership-by-the-numbers
[https://perma.cc/87EH-XMF4].
6 Benefit plans can allow investment in employer stock through elective deferrals or directly as required in an ESOP plan. See 401(k) Plans as Employee Ownership
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tant for airlines and aircraft manufacturers who generally have
prominent positions and reputations at stake in their benefit
plans: The Boeing Company’s (Boeing) retirement plan included $10.8 billion of its common stock in 2018,7 Airbus’s
ESOP offered 2.2 million shares in their ESOP in 2021,8 Lockheed Martin had $6.04 billion in the ESOP fund in 2018,9 and
United Airlines had notable troubles with their ESOP offering
after filing for bankruptcy in 2002.10 Additionally, even smaller
airlines offer ESOP plans for their employees.11
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) regulates most employer plans.12 ERISA has been described as a “comprehensive and reticulated statute”13 and “an
enormously complex and detailed statute that resolve[s] innumerable disputes between powerful competing interests—not all
in favor of potential plaintiffs.”14 Conflicting ERISA requirements with other laws regarding duties and responsibilities are
typically interpreted by courts when Congress is unclear, but the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to supplement ERISA with
other remedies due to the thoroughness of ERISA’s obligaVehicles, Alone and in Combination with ESOPs, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.nceo.org/articles/401k-plans-employee-ownershipesops [https://perma.cc/EAB8-AL5J].
7 The Boeing Co. & Consol. Subsidiaries, Annual Return/Report of Employee
Benefit Plan (Form 5500) (July 24, 2019) [hereinafter 2018 Boeing Co. Form
5500] (page ten of attachment to filing).
8 Information Document from David Zakin, Head of Corporate Affairs, Airbus
SE, to Employee Participants 2 (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.airbus.com/sites/
g/files/jlcbta136/files/2021-07/ESOP%202021%20%20EU%20note%28English%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5ND-U28T]. Airbus is
issued on United Kingdom (UK) stock exchanges and is governed by UK law. See,
e.g., Airbus SE, LONDON STOCK EXCH., https://www.londonstockexchange.com/
market-stock/0KVV/airbus-se/overview [https://perma.cc/NWC7-WE9V]. However, it is illustrated here to show the usage of ESOP plans in the manufacturing
and airline industries.
9 Lockheed Martin Corp., Annual Reports of Employee Stock Purchase, Savings, and Similar Plans (Form 11-K) 2 (June 24, 2019).
10 See Bill Fotsch & John Case, United’s Troubles Could Have Been Avoided, FORBES
(Apr. 17, 2017, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fotschcase/2017/04/
17/uniteds-troubles-could-have-been-avoided/?sh=268a5f5cc06 [https://
perma.cc/7QQ6-99J5].
11 See, e.g., Benefits, CAPE AIR (2020), https://www.capeairpilots.com/benefits
[https://perma.cc/5N64-2BL3].
12 ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/healthplans/erisa [https://perma.cc/28AR-V4K6]; see 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
13 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
14 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54–56 (1987)).
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tions.15 Because ESOP plans are covered under ERISA, they are
frequently subject to litigation concerning the broad fiduciary
duties required by employers who offer qualified plans.16 ERISA
regulates any “pension plan” that “provides retirement income
to employees” or “results in a deferral of income by employees
for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.”17
This Comment analyzes the current Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer pleading standard in ERISA stock drop cases, showing how it immunizes employers from valid claims brought by
plaintiffs who have been harmed by their employer’s failure to
oversee and make prudent investment decisions for plan participants. Under the Dudenhoeffer standard, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative action that the defendant could have
taken that would have been consistent with the securities laws
and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would
not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help
it.”18 In essence, these cases boil down to this: the employer
knows that their stock is overvalued (due to lack of disclosure of
some form of company information); the employer takes inappropriate actions to either conceal or mask the overvaluation;
and then unwitting employees bear the brunt of the harm when
that negative information comes to light. Because plan investments are limited in many benefit plans, employees trust their
employers on investment options.
The Dudenhoeffer standard should be difficult to overcome because the policy considerations of Congress are clear that employer stock plans are meant to be promoted as a matter of
policy.19 However, serious tensions exist when companies—especially airlines, public utilities, and other public companies—
knowingly or negligently endanger the public through their actions, and their stock price suffers because of failure to take corrective action.
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999).
See Joseph P. Yonadi, Jr., ESOPs, Stock-Drop Litigation and Jander, LABOR &
EMP. NEWS, Summer 2020, at 7; 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (setting forth the numerous
duties owed by fiduciaries under ERISA).
17 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
18 Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428 (2014).
19 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(h), 90 Stat. 1520, 1590
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (“The Congress, in a
series of laws [including ERISA] has made clear its interest in encouraging [ESOPs] as a bold and innovative method of strengthening the free private enterprise system . . .”).
15
16
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Certain industries whose actions fall below the prudent standard of care that have devastating effects on society should be
held to a different standard when they mask these violations,
and it leads to public harm—or in Boeing’s case, the deaths of
hundreds. In other words, if there are risks to public safety
known by the employer, then corrective disclosure or remedial
actions would generally not do more harm than good. Thus, in
these contexts, the plaintiffs’ alleged alternative actions should
successfully meet the Dudenhoeffer standard at the motion to dismiss stage.
Part II of this Comment examines the 737 MAX crashes, background, and ensuing litigation, with an analysis of the district
court’s dismissal of the action. Next, Part III reviews the historical evolution of the Dudenhoeffer pleading standard, demonstrating how difficult the motion to dismiss barrier has become in
these stock drop cases. Finally, Part IV suggests that public safety
should be a heavily considered factor when requiring entities,
especially airlines, to either provide corrective disclosures or
face the consequences after a public disaster—even when utilizing an ERISA § 3(38) investment fiduciary.20
II.

THE 737 MAX CRASHES AND SUBSEQUENT ERISA
SUIT

One of the most recent stock drop cases21 to affect these enormous employer stock investments is Burke v. Boeing Company.22
There, investors in the Boeing employee stock ownership plan
alleged a breach of duty of prudence through failure to make
corrective disclosures, a breach of duty of prudence by failure to
monitor investments, and a breach of co-fiduciary duty.23 These
29 U.S.C. § 1002(38)(A).
Stock drop cases are cases that allege that an ERISA fiduciary fell below their
standard of care in offering their company stock in their retirement plans. See
Yonadi, supra note 16, at 7–8.
22 500 F. Supp. 3d 717 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
23 Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 67–72, Burke v. Boeing Co.,
500 F. Supp. 3d 717 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (No. 1:19-CV-02203). Fiduciaries under ERISA can be held liable for co-fiduciary breach if they “participate[ ] knowingly in,
or knowingly undertake[ ] to conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary,
knowing such act or omission is a breach,” 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1); enable another fiduciary to breach their duties, id. § 1105(a)(2); or “if he has knowledge of
a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to remedy the breach.” Id. § 1105(a)(3).
20
21
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allegations made headlines due to the sheer size of the potential
liability—that is, if the court found breaches existed.24
A.

THE CRASHES

AND

ALLEGATIONS

The Boeing 737 MAX model commercial jet was one of Boeing’s best-selling aircraft before the crashes in 2018 and 2019.25
In October 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 (a Boeing 737 MAX)
crashed into the Java Sea after thirteen minutes in flight and
killed all 189 passengers on board.26 Subsequently, on March 10,
2019, Ethiopian Flight 302 crashed into a farm field six minutes
after leaving Addis Ababa Airport and killed 157 passengers.27
Diane Burke, a Boeing ESOP participant, alleged that the defendants knew or should have known about issues related to the
aircraft before the 2018 crash.28 Ms. Burke included facts in her
complaint which showed (1) rushed plans due to market competition,29 (2) errors in moving the engine location on 737 MAX
models,30 (3) faulty and negligent application of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS),31 (4) expert
testimony regarding design flaws,32 and (5) allegations that Boeing had notice of the problem with the MCAS system.33 Especially pertinent was a former engineer’s testimony that the
warning system involved with the engine repositioning and the
See, e.g., Erin Shaak, Boeing Facing ERISA Lawsuit in the Wake of 737 MAX Plane
Crashes, CLASSACTION.ORG, https://www.classaction.org/news/boeing-facing-erisa-lawsuit-in-the-wake-of-737-max-plane-crashes [https://perma.cc/5ELUM6CG] (Apr. 7, 2021).
25 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 23, at 12.
26 Sinéad Baker, This Timeline Shows Exactly What Happened on Board the Lion Air
Boeing 737 Max That Crashed in Less Than 13 Minutes, Killing 189 People, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2019, 12:11 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/lion-air-crashtimeline-boeing-737-max-disaster-killed-189-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/9FKEE6P4].
27 Jeff Wise, 6 Minutes of Terror: What Passengers and Crew Experienced Aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 9, 2019), https://
nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/what-passengers-experienced-on-the-ethiopian-airlines-flight.html [https://perma.cc/SJC5-CKSD].
28 Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 23, at 12.
29 Id. at 12–13.
30 This movement significantly shifted the weight of the plane, leading to design issues. Id. at 13–14.
31 Id. at 22–23.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 18.
24
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MCAS caused other engineers to speculate as to the safety of the
aircraft before product launch.34
After the crashes, Boeing’s Company President and CEO,
Dennis Muilenburg, was questioned in front of Congress, and
evidence arose that “suggest[ed] the company did know enough
to at least question the safety of continuing to fly the 737 Max
[after the Lion Air crash].”35 Boeing recognized the problems
after the Lion Air disaster and began working on a software fix
but “fail[ed] to inform the public.”36 Boeing continued to assert,
even in the face of the erroneous software, that “[it was] confident in the safety of the 737 Max. Safety remain[ed] [its] top
priority.”37 Boeing neither disclosed any safety problems nor
made any safety corrections to its then available aircraft, which
allegedly led to the Ethiopian Air crash the following year. The
material facts imply that Boeing was negligent in its installation
and continued usage of the MCAS software.
After the Ethiopian Air crash, Boeing stock spiraled from
$422.54 to $375.41 in a matter of two business days—an 11%
decrease in wealth for any investment in Boeing.38 During that
time, Muilenburg called former President Trump and assured
him of the safety of the 737 MAX, urging the former President
not to ground the planes.39 Even when confronted with severe
34 Id. at 22; see also Peter Robison, Julie Johnsson, Ben Elgin, Margaret Newkirk
& Anders Melin, Former Boeing Engineers Say Relentless Cost-Cutting Sacrificed Safety,
Bloomberg: Businessweek (May 8, 2019, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/features/2019-05-09/former-boeing-engineers-say-relentless-cost-cuttingsacrificed-safety [https://perma.cc/UH39-ZJ7B].
35 David Schaper, 3 Takeaways from 2 Days of Tense Boeing Congressional Hearings,
NPR (Nov. 2, 2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/02/775553377/3takeaways-from-2-days-of-tense-boeing-congressional-hearings [https://perma.cc/
L27S-XD3T].
36 Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 23, at 27.
37 Dominic Gates, U.S. Pilots Flying 737 MAX Weren’t Told About New Automatic
Systems Change Linked to Lion Air Crash, SEATTLE TIMES, https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-pilots-flying-737-maxwerent-told-about-new-automatic-systems-change-linked-to-lion-air-crash/ [https:/
/perma.cc/CRB8-EWDR] (Nov. 13, 2018, 1:43 PM).
38 The Boeing Company (BA) Price at Close: Historical Data (Mar. 7, 2019 - Mar. 29,
2019), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BA/ [https://perma.cc/
7RQW-WBT6] (choose “Historical Data” from menu; then click “Time Period”;
set “Start Date” as “03/08/2019” and “End Date” as “03/30/2019”; then click
“Done”: then click “Apply”).
39 Natalie Kitroeff & David Gelles, Trump Called Boeing C.E.O. About Potential
Shutdown of 737 Max, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/business/trump-boeing-dennis-muilenburg.html [https://perma.cc/7VFZ-9Z9R]
(Dec. 23, 2019).
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safety concerns, expert speculation about unsafe design, and almost two hundred dead after the first Lion Air disaster, Boeing
maintained that the 737 MAX was safe.40 Unsatisfied with Boeing’s efforts to assure the public, the plaintiffs asserted Boeing’s
safety mishaps would inevitably be disclosed to the public due to
Boeing’s duty to disclose safety issues with the 737 MAX.41 “The
crashes have drawn intense scrutiny of the plane maker’s engineering culture, damaged the company’s relationships with suppliers and customers, and led to the ouster of its chief executive
last month.”42
B.

THE BOEING RETIREMENT PLAN

Boeing’s retirement plan had approximately $58.7 billion in
total assets as of the end of 2018.43 Boeing offered a defined
contribution plan, which allowed for employee deferrals and investments in Boeing’s stock—thus making it an ESOP44—and
had $10.8 billion invested in Boeing stock as of the end of
2018.45 As of the end of 2019, this number had decreased to just
over $10 billion,46 presumably due to some decrease in stock
value and other factors. As of late January 2022, Boeing stock
was trading at just over $205.47 Investors who may have invested
See, e.g., Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 23, at 47–49.
Id. at 57.
42 Doug Cameron & Andrew Tangel, Boeing Posts Full-Year Loss Amid 737 MAX
Setbacks, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-falls-to-full-year-loss11580302091 [https://perma.cc/FFR4-Z8LT] (Jan. 29, 2020, 6:07 PM).
43 2018 Boeing Co. Form 5500, supra note 7 (page 1 of Schedule H “Financial
Information” attachment).
44 Employers are required to include on Form 5500s a variety of codes to show
the features of defined contribution pension plans, including “2O” and “2P”
which indicate whether the plan includes an ESOP feature. See Form 5500 Codes
and Legends, FREEERISA.COM, https://freeerisa.benefitspro.com/static/popups/
legends.aspx#BenefitPension09 [https://perma.cc/48Z9-UK3G]; 2018 Boeing
Co. Form 5500, supra note 7 (section 8a of main form).
45 2018 Boeing Co. Form 5500, supra note 7 (page ten of attachment to filing).
46 The Boeing Co. & Consol. Subsidiaries, Annual Return/Report of Employee
Benefit Plan (Form 5500) (July 13, 2020) [hereinafter 2019 Boeing Co. Form
5500] (page ten of attachment to filing).
47 The Boeing Company (BA) Price at Close (Jan. 23, 2022), YAHOO! FIN., https://
finance.yahoo.com/quote/BA/ [https://perma.cc/QVR9-R9NF]. The COVID19 pandemic also likely had an impact on the stock’s value. The stock price
dropped from $422.54 prior to the MAX crashes to $330.22—a 22% drop—just
before the pandemic began. See The Boeing Company (BA) Price at Close: Historical
Data (Mar. 7, 2019 - Jan. 13, 2020), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/
quote/BA/ [https://perma.cc/G7MD-YWGR] (choose “Historical Data” from
menu; then click “Time Period”; set “Start Date” as “03/08/2019” and “End
Date” as “01/14/2020”; then click “Done”: then click “Apply”).
40
41
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in the employer stock at the peak before the crashes would have
experienced a loss of nearly 50% of their wealth since then.
Boeing had an Employee Benefit Plans Committee (EBPC),48
an Employee Benefit Investment Committee (EBIC), and multiple individual committee members involved with the retirement
benefit plan.49 Of note, on August 9, 2017, Boeing, the EBIC,
and Evercore Trust Company, N.A. (Evercore), agreed to fiduciary responsibility over investments of the plan assets.50 ERISA
designates as plan fiduciaries anyone who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets.”51 Thus, employing an investment manager as a fiduciary to the plan
removes discretionary control of a retirement plan’s assets when
a Section 3(38) advisor is utilized.52
C.

THE CURRENT ERISA STOCK DROP CASE

The plaintiffs alleged there was a significant breach of fiduciary duty, including (1) breach of duty of prudence, (2) failure
to monitor investments, and (3) breach of co-fiduciary duty.53
The plaintiffs alleged that Boeing knew or should have known
about the safety issues with the 737 MAX,54 which led Boeing to
know its stock was overvalued, and the market correction
harmed the unwary investors in the Boeing retirement plan.55
The defendants—including Boeing, the EBPC, the EBIC, and
the individual defendants—moved to dismiss the case, arguing
that (1) they were not fiduciaries with respect to the decision to
include Boeing stock in the retirement plan, (2) the plaintiffs
did not meet the alternative action standard emphasized in
48 2019 Boeing Co. Form 5500, supra note 46 (section 3a of main form). The
EBPC was the plan administrator pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A).
49 Typically, committees are set up to run various aspects of retirement plans.
For instance, plan administrative committees may oversee the administration and
plan design, while retirement committees may be set up to review investment
options in the plan. See What Is a Retirement Plan Committee and Why Is it Important?,
SC&H GRP. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.schgroup.com/resource/blog-post/retirement-plan-committee-important/ [https://perma.cc/QEH3-ELAV].
50 Burke v. Boeing Co., 500 F. Supp. 3d 717, 724–25 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
51 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
52 See id. § 1002(38)(A).
53 Burke, 500 F. Supp. 3d at 723.
54 See supra Section II.A.
55 See supra Section II.B.
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Dudenhoeffer, and (3) the second and third causes of action fail
as a matter of law.56
In November 2020, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs
failed to allege that a fiduciary duty existed for all defendants.57
The assignment of investment management responsibility to
Evercore (referred to in the court opinion as Newport) relieved
the fiduciary responsibility from all Boeing defendants, as they
no longer had discretionary authority over the plan investments—most importantly, the Boeing stock fund.58 However,
the court took its analysis a step further and ruled that, even
assuming the defendants were fiduciaries, the plaintiffs failed to
meet the Dudenhoeffer pleading standard for stock drop cases
and that their pleadings were insufficient as a matter of law.59
This additional step illustrates how difficult it is for plaintiffs to
meet the pleading standard in ERISA stock drop cases, even
with plausible allegations of irresponsible corporate boards.
However, the district court did take a context-specific analysis
and neglected to consider other factors such as public safety
when reviewing the pleading standard set forth in Dudenhoeffer.
The court’s extended analysis and the aforementioned stance
serve as the basis for review in Part IV.
On December 9, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.60 At the time this Comment went to print, the Seventh
Circuit had not yet issued its opinion. The Seventh Circuit appeared to acknowledge the severity of the Burke case, with one
Judge on the panel stating during oral argument that “we hope
most of [these cases] are not as bad as this news,” illustrating
that not all alternative actions alleged in stock drop cases are
alike.61 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the requirement that claims of breach of the fiduciary
duty of prudence “turns on ‘the circumstances . . . prevailing’ at
the time [of] the fiduciary acts” and that “the appropriate inquiry will necessarily be context specific.”62 This holding directly
requires courts to consider the entirety of the circumstances
Burke, 500 F. Supp. 3d at 723.
Id. at 725.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 725–27.
60 Burke v. Boeing Co., No. 20-3389 (7th Cir. filed Dec. 9, 2020).
61 Oral Argument at 8:37, Burke v. Boeing Co., No. 20-3389 (7th Cir. May 21,
2021), https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/76762/diane-burke-v-the-boeingcompany/.
62 Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 142 S. Ct. 737, 742 (2022) (quoting Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014)).
56
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that fiduciaries faced at the time of the breach. Public safety is a
circumstance that must be considered because deaths due to
negligent design always will do more harm than not to shareholder value.63
III.

EXPLAINING THE DUDENHOEFFER STANDARD AND
THE EVOLUTION OF ERISA STOCK DROP CASES

While ESOPs were first promulgated in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,64 they only gained popularity after the
passage of ERISA in 1974 (which explicitly governs ESOPs).65
These plans were initially meant to increase employee stock
ownership and benefit those employees who remained with the
employer for long periods.66 As employers are typically fiduciaries with respect to ESOP plans, they are held to the highest
standards when offering these benefit plans.67
When the tech bubble burst in the 2000s, employees in hardhit tech industries experienced a significant decline in their retirement savings and began to allege breach of fiduciary duties
against their employers who offered these plans.68 These cases
became so popular that they were deemed “stock drop” cases
and have evolved in a wide array of industries.69 However, stock
drop cases have been notoriously difficult to pursue in the face
of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding pleading standards
in these cases.70 The practically insurmountable barriers erected
by the Supreme Court leave unsophisticated employees without
protection when their employers know that they are offering investment options that are overvalued and inappropriate for retirement income.
See infra Section IV.A.
See Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 102(5),
87 Stat. 985, 987 (1974) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 16) (repealed
1994).
65 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7).
66 E.g., David R. Johanson & Rachel J. Markun, Description and Purpose of an
ESOP, HAWKINS PARNELL & YOUNG, LLP (2016), https://www.hpylaw.com/publications/description-and-purpose-of-an-esop/ [https://perma.cc/UWG2-6V89].
67 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
68 See Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: An Evolving
Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 897 (2005).
69 See Yonadi, supra note 16, at 7.
70 See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428 (2014); Ret.
Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 594 (2020) (per curiam).
63
64
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ERISA FIDUCIARY STANDARDS

An analysis of the fiduciary duties in employee benefit plans
must first be reviewed to understand these obstacles. Section
1104 of ERISA outlines the duties of loyalty and prudence for
ERISA fiduciaries: (1) discharging their duties for the sole purpose of the beneficiaries (duty of loyalty),71 (2) defraying reasonable expenses of the plan (also encompassed in the duty of
loyalty),72 (3) discharging their duties “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims” (duty of prudence),73 and (4) diversifying assets of the plan to minimize the risk of large losses
for participants.74 Fiduciaries can either be named fiduciaries,
such as those named in plan documents, or functional fiduciaries, who do not need to be outlined in plan documents.75 When
analyzing fiduciary duties, courts first ask a threshold question:
“[W]hether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was
performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action subject
to complaint.”76 Thus, looking to named and functional fiduciaries, fiduciary duty extends to “anyone else who exercises discretionary control or authority over the plan’s management,
administration, or assets.”77
An additional provision applies to ESOPs, and it removes the
duty of diversification for the eligible individual account plans.78
This is because while promoting retirement savings and minimizing risks of losses for employees, these plans also involve special interests in “promot[ing] employee ownership of employer
stock.”79 The Supreme Court has been clear that this exempts
ESOP providers from the duty of prudence, “but ‘only to the extent that it requires diversification.’ ”80 This distinction is essential as
employers must abide by other duty of prudence requirements
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii).
73 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
74 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
75 Remy Grosbard, Note, The Duty to Inform In the Post-Dudenhoeffer World of ERISA, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 84 (2017).
76 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226 (2000).
77 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993).
78 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(2), 1107(d)(3)(A)(ii).
79 Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420 (2014).
80 Id. at 419.
71
72
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regarding continual investment selection monitoring and removing inappropriate investment choices.81 Fiduciaries of these
plans typically may be fiduciaries in many capacities, but ERISA
requires that “the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a
time, and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”82 This becomes a struggle in some instances where a corporate officer must juggle the duty of prudence with complex
securities laws.83
Over time, in order for plaintiffs to allege a plausible claim for
a fiduciary breach, the bar has become an almost insuperable
barrier to even proceed past the motion to dismiss stages of litigation. Courts have continued to analyze the fiduciary duty standards imposed by ERISA, and the standard for pleading a
violation of fiduciary responsibility in stock drop cases has significantly changed over time. However, the analysis remains limited to blanket assumptions instead of context specific inquiries.
B.

THE PRE-DUDENHOEFFER ERA AND
PRUDENCE

THE

PRESUMPTION

OF

When stock drop cases proliferated following the tech bust in
the 2000s, circuit courts generally gave employers deference in
these claims by granting them a “presumption of prudence,”
which generally required plaintiffs to plausibly allege a breach
of fiduciary duty by showing some sort of impending bankruptcy
or collapse.84 However, the Sixth Circuit took this one step further in favor of plaintiffs. It ruled that the brink of collapse was
not necessary, but only that the plaintiffs needed to allege “a
prudent fiduciary acting under similar circumstances would
Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 530 (2015).
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000) (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443–44 (1999); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497
(1996)).
83 See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428 (noting that fiduciaries must act consistently
with securities laws).
84 This was the method used by the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
in some capacity prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dudenhoeffer, which
abrogated or vacated each of these decisions. See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d
553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573
U.S. 409 (2014); Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 418 (6th
Cir. 2012), vacated, 573 U.S. 409 (2014); White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714
F.3d 980, 988–89 (7th Cir. 2013), abrogated by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014); Quan v. Comput. Scis. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 879–82 (9th
Cir. 2010), abrogated by Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409
(2014).
81
82
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have made a different investment decision.”85 Other courts took
a similar stance, stating that good faith is not a defense as “a
pure heart and an empty head are not enough.”86
One early example of this application—and a clear showing
of how unlikely it is for plaintiffs to succeed in this context—is
DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc.87 There, an ESOP plan participant
brought an action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2),88 claiming that
U.S. Airways was considering filing bankruptcy while still offering its employer stock to plan participants.89 The court noted
that “[a]lthough all airlines struggled [even before the September 11 attacks], U.S. Airways faced particular challenges.”90 However, the court strongly rebuked a backward-looking approach,
stating it was not appropriate when evaluating stock drop fiduciary duty breach claims.91 Based on U.S. Airways’ actions in assessing the plan investments on a consistent and regular basis
and inference of Congress’s creation of a per se rule in favor of
employer stock, U.S. Airways had not breached a fiduciary
duty.92
Courts continued to utilize some form of this “per se” rule of
prudence in cases, which effectively bars any stock drop cases
from proceeding past the motion to dismiss stage.93 Many observers believed that the Supreme Court review of the presumption of prudence standard, first expounded by the Third Circuit

85 Dudenhoeffer, 692 F.3d at 418 (quoting Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459
(6th Cir. 1995)).
86 Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983).
87 497 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2007).
88 This provides a civil cause of action for any plan participant who alleges a
breach of fiduciary duty. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109(a).
89 DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737–38 (E.D. Va. 2005).
90 DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 415.
91 See id. at 424–25.
92 See id. at 421, 424–25 (“Congress has explicitly provided that qualifying concentrated investment in employer stock does not violate the ‘prudent man’ standard per se.”).
93 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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in Moench v. Robertson,94 would prove to be more plaintifffriendly.95 However, this has shown to be quite the opposite.96
C. DUDENHOEFFER

ALTERNATIVE ACTION PLEADING
STANDARD

AND THE

The Supreme Court took up the Dudenhoeffer case in 2014
when the plaintiffs alleged a breach of fiduciary duty after Fifth
Third Bancorp’s (Fifth Third) stock plummeted due to risky investments in subprime lending markets.97 Fifth Third offered
twenty investment funds and its stock in its retirement plan.98
Employees who filed suit alleged that Fifth Third knew about
the risky investment profile of the company, failed to disclose it,
continued to offer stock in the retirement plan, and then “Fifth
Third’s stock price fell by 74% between July 2007 and September 2009.”99
1.

Current Supreme Court Interpretation

The Supreme Court undertook a close analysis of the presumption of prudence that previous circuit courts employed in
their opinions.100 The Supreme Court concluded that due to the
congressional intent and specific language of ERISA in its allocation of fiduciary duties,101 the presumption of prudence is improper for ERISA fiduciaries.102 This statement would make one
think that the Supreme Court meant to soften the strict preThe Third Circuit held in Moench that “an ESOP fiduciary who invests the
assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently
with ERISA by virtue of that decision. However, the plaintiff may overcome that
presumption by establishing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing
in employer securities.” 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 418–19 (2014) (finding no such presumption exists as to ERISA ESOP fiduciaries).
95 See Joseph C. Faucher & Dylan D. Rudolph, ERISA Stock Drop Cases Since
Dudenhoeffer: The Pleading Standard Has Been Raised, 24 J. PENSION BENEFITS 3, 4
(2017), https://www.truckerhuss.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
JPB_Spring17.PDF-Adobe-Acrobat.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7P7-QSEH].
96 See id.
97 See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 413–14.
98 Id. at 412.
99 Id. at 413–14.
100 Id. at 428 (noting that fiduciaries must act consistently with securities laws);
id. at 417–18.
101 Id. at 418–19 (noting that the same standard of prudence applies to all
ERISA fiduciaries and that the only difference is the relief from the need to diversify investments pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2)).
102 Id. at 418 (“[T]he law does not create a special presumption favoring ESOP
fiduciaries.”).
94
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sumption of prudence; however, further analysis shows it does
not.103
Justice Breyer put forth three key points that govern the
pleading standard for stock drop cases: (1) fiduciaries of ERISAgoverned plans are not compelled to break securities laws,104 (2)
courts must “consider duties under ERISA in the context of securities laws,”105 and (3) when alleging a fiduciary acted imprudently by failing to act based on nonpublic information,106
plaintiffs must plausibly allege an alternative action “that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed
as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.”107 In other
terms, a plaintiff must put forth an alternative action that any
prudent fiduciary could not have decided that the harm from
such action might outweigh the benefits.
The plaintiffs in Dudenhoeffer alleged many alternative actions:
(1) selling the ESOP’s holdings of Fifth Third stock; (2) refraining from future stock purchases (including by removing the
Plan’s ESOP option altogether); or (3) publicly disclosing the inside information so that the market would correct the stock price
downward, with the result that the ESOP could continue to buy
Fifth Third stock without paying an inflated price for it.108

However, the Court found that each of these alternative actions failed to meet the new pleading standard.109 First,
“[f]ederal securities laws ‘are violated when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.’ ”110 Next, the Court noted that discontinuing purchases of the stock or publicly disclosing negative
information may do more harm than good111—effectively barring the second two claims on remand.112 While the Court has
103 In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 113 F. Supp. 3d 745, 755 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (“Moreover, Dudenhoeffer appears to have ‘raised the bar for plaintiffs seeking to bring a claim based on a breach of the duty of prudence.’”).
104 Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428.
105 Grosbard, supra note 75, at 81 (citing Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 429).
106 The standards for pleading that the fiduciary should have acted on public
material information are different and easily defeated due to efficient market
theory. See White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714 F.3d 980, 992 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, the focus of this Comment is on nonpublic information.
107 Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 428–30.
110 Id. at 428 (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997)).
111 Id. at 429–30.
112 The class action against Fifth Third eventually settled on July 11, 2016, and
thus the test was not fully applied in this case by the district court. Dudenhoeffer
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previously considered the duty to disclose truthful information,
they have declined to resolve the question.113
The Supreme Court ruled again on ERISA stock drop cases in
Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander but left many questions unanswered.114 Many observers hoped that the Supreme
Court would clarify the alternative action standard. But the
Court left open the decision instead by ruling that the lower
court did not adequately address the question of plausible allegations of an alternative action.115 In Jander, the plaintiffs alleged that IBM attempted to conceal an incorrect valuation of a
microelectronic business unit, and when that unit was finally
sold, IBM stock declined.116 However, the Supreme Court
punted the question, stating that the Second Circuit did not analyze the alternative actions alleged because the Second Circuit
incorrectly focused the ruling on the duties imposed by
ERISA.117
2.

Post-Dudenhoeffer Circuit Rulings
After the Dudenhoeffer ruling, courts continued to dismiss cases
under the new alternative action standard. Because “[t]here is
no specific definition of a prudent process under ERISA[,]”118
courts have been reluctant to find companies in violation of
their fiduciary duty regarding employer stock offerings.
The Ninth Circuit undertook an examination of the HewlettPackard Company (HP) ESOP after a bungled acquisition that
had included the target firm’s improper accounting practices,
which subsequently led to a decline in HP’s stock value postmerger.119 After HP was alerted to a whistleblower action and
began an investigation, the court found that a prudent fiduciary
v. Fifth Third Bancorp, No. 08-CV-538, 2016 WL 8135394, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July
11, 2016).
113 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996); Grosbard, supra note 75,
at 89–90.
114 See Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 594–95 (2020) (per
curiam).
115 Id. at 595.
116 Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 592 (2020) (per curiam).
117 See Jander, 140 S. Ct. at 595 (“The Second Circuit ‘did not address the[se]
argument[s], and, for that reason, neither shall we.’”) (alteration in original).
118 Allen Buckley, A Means of Meeting the Dudenhoeffer Standard, 23 J. PENSION
BENEFITS 10, 11 (2015), http://www.allenbuckleylaw.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/10/Article-A-Means-of-Meeting-the-Dudenhoeffer-Standard1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LKF5-J6LG].
119 See Laffen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 721 F. App’x 642, 643–44 (9th Cir. 2018).
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could have concluded that finishing an investigation was more
beneficial prior to issuing public disclosures of accounting
problems.120 There was no clear evidence that HP corporate was
aware of the material misrepresentations.121 Thus, the plaintiffs’
claim failed.122 However, this case involved accounting fraud,
and the court noted that the plaintiffs erred in faulting HP “for
first investigating the whistleblower’s allegations before taking
action, [because] a prudent fiduciary must first investigate
problems before acting.”123 HP did not comment further during
the investigation.124 Here, accounting fraud has a low impact on
public health, whereas major cases, including Boeing, may (and
did) have disastrous consequences for continuing to assert the
safety of their airplanes. The Ninth Circuit correctly decided
this case by viewing the Dudenhoeffer requirements in the context
of the underlying industry.
The Second Circuit also found similar problems with the
plaintiff allegations in Loeza v. John Does 1–10, where employees
of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan) alleged that risky investments by JPMorgan led to a 16% drop in share price in one
day.125 The plaintiffs’ claims were based on a commonly rejected
economic theory of reputational damage through delayed disclosure.126 Without particularizing the factors that “[d]efendants
might have considered when deciding whether to make public
disclosures[,]” the plaintiffs’ claims that corrective disclosure
would be prudent failed.127 Furthermore, even fraud in terms of
investments was insufficient to satisfy the alternative action
prong set forth in Dudenhoeffer.128 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the longer a fraud goes on, the more painful the [stock price] correction would be, as experienced
finance executives . . . reasonably should have known.”129 Again,
fraud is more difficult to value, and entities in this area are more
likely to second-guess decisions before disclosure or completion
See id. at 644.
See In re HP ERISA Litig., No. 3:12-CV-06199, 2015 WL 3749565, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. June 15, 2015), aff’d, 721 F. App’x 642 (9th Cir. 2018).
122 Laffen, 721 F. App’x at 644.
123 Id. (citing Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1996)).
124 See In re HP Erisa Litig., 2015 WL 3749565, at *5.
125 659 F. App’x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2016).
126 See In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. ERISA Litig., No. 12 Civ. 04027, 2016 WL
110521, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Loeza, 659 F. App’x at 45–46.
120
121

216

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

of investigations. However, when danger to the public exists
through promoting a dangerous product, this is more easily calculated.130 It should be clear to any prudent fiduciary that failure to act or make a corrective disclosure would do more harm
than good.
One case that denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss in stock
drop cases was Murray v. Invacare Corp., in which the plaintiffs
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Invacare (a long-term and
home medical equipment manufacturer and distributor).131 In
Murray, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated numerous U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) safety and
manufacturing regulations and took actions to conceal or delay
disclosure of the violations.132 The announcement of an FDA
consent decree caused a 29% decrease in share price because of
the violations.133 Prior to the mandatory disclosure, Invacare
continued to offer their employer stock in their retirement plan
even with the knowledge of the FDA safety violations.134 While
limiting the class certification dates, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs had met their burden with respect to the Dudenhoeffer
requirements when the defendants did not limit employee investment in Invacare stock because they had a clear knowledge
of violating safety regulations.135
These cases illustrate different stock drop claims that can arise
under ERISA. Coupled with Burke, courts should be more willing to look at alleged alternative actions and how corrective disclosure or restriction plays out in diverse industrial contexts. In
particular, when companies like the one in Murray are committing safety violations, the scales should tip in favor of the plaintiffs because public health and safety are at risk. And this factor
should also weigh more heavily when evaluating an employer’s
decision to continue offering employer stock.
IV. SAFETY VIOLATIONS SHOULD SATISFY THE
DUDENHOEFFER PLEADING STANDARD IN ERISA
STOCK DROP CASES
One key difference between many circuit court rulings is the
public’s interest in safety. While corrective disclosure is not gen130
131
132
133
134
135

See infra Section IV.A.
125 F. Supp. 3d 660, 663 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
Id. at 669–70.
Id. at 670.
See id. at 669.
See id. at 669 & n.3.
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erally required,136 when a company is so entrenched in the public space and has defects in their products, manufacturing, or
other goods, the failure to make corrective disclosures should
be a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA if a plaintiff alleges
that the employer knows or should have known of a strong potential of tangible, real harm its products could cause. Courts
should look to the type of industry the entity is engaged in and
allow discovery to determine the boundaries of the duty to monitor investments under ERISA.
A.

IMPLICATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ALLEGING ALTERNATIVE
ACTIONS, AND A DUTY TO DISCLOSE

While studies on a defective product’s effects on long-term
firm value are relatively slim, there is empirical evidence on the
mitigating impact of voluntary recall initiations and post-recall
remedial efforts.137 Products liability may inform the effects of
voluntary disclosure and its impact on stock price, as accounting
fraud and misrepresentations are intangible harms that are difficult to measure. For example, product recalls are typical in the
automobile space, as “the auto industry experienced an average
of 122 recalls per firm between 1997 and 2010.”138
Although short-term returns are negatively affected as consumer preferences and future sales decrease, by voluntarily instead of mandatorily recalling products, “cash flow losses
anticipated over the long term can be significantly mitigated,
reducing the likelihood of investor devaluation of the firm.”139
One study found “the stock market punishes recall delays. Thus,
voluntary recall initiation has a favorable impact on the investors
in the long run.”140 This finding mirrors another automotive industry report that found recall delays resulted in shareholder
losses of $103 million and concluded “that regulators may need
to be proactive in nudging diverse brands to respond to safety
investigations in a timely manner.”141 However, a study in toy
defects found that a more extended recall period is beneficial to
See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
Yan Liu, Venkatesh Shankar & Wonjoo Yun, Crisis Management Strategies and
the Long-Term Effects of Product Recalls on Firm Value, 81 J. MKTG. 30, 30 (2017).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 33, 35.
140 Id. at 44.
141 Meike Eilert, Satish Jayachandran, Kartik Kalaignanam & Tracey A. Swartz,
Does It Pay to Recall Your Product Early? An Empirical Investigation in the Automobile
Industry, 81 J. MKTG. 111, 126 (2017).
136
137

218

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[87

avoid the drastic response from loss-averse investors, but the
study notes that this strategy would be inapplicable “in response
to deaths or as part of a government-mandated recall.”142 This
same study also found that the business effects may depend on
other industrial contexts.143
A single 737 MAX jet is estimated to cost around $125 million.144 These are not lower-cost toys that can be discarded easily; they are massive investments intended to last twenty-five
years or more.145 Additionally, the airline industry’s range of
consumers is broader than the toy industry. The number of passengers on U.S. and foreign airlines totaled over one billion
people in 2018.146 Domestic airlines carried 778 million passengers in 2018—an increase of 4.9% from the previous year.147
And airline crashes are typically subject to extensive media attention due to the larger scale of consequences.148
With such large investments and the public interest at stake, it
is difficult to infer that a corrective disclosure would do more
harm than good in certain industries. Companies whose boards
are comprised of sophisticated businesspeople have empirical
evidence about the benefits of early disclosure and should have
a duty to make corrective market disclosures to meet their fiduciary responsibilities.149 Plaintiffs should be able to allege correc142 Lincoln C. Wood, Jason X. Wang, Karin Olesen & Torsten Reiners, The
Effect of Slack, Diversification, and Time to Recall on Stock Market Reaction to Toy Recalls, 193 INT’L J. PROD. ECON. 244, 255 (2017).
143 See id. at 256.
144 E.g., Jon Sindreu, The Boeing 737 MAX Question Is About Price, Not Sales, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2020, 2:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-boeing-737max-question-is-about-price-not-sales-11607022092 [https://perma.cc/3S5ZQ3NZ].
145 See, e.g., Oliver Smith, Revealed: The Oldest Passenger Planes Still in Service –
Have You Flown on Any of Them?, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travel-truths/oldest-passenger-plane-still-in-service/
[https://perma.cc/A9DU-8MEF] (stating aircraft are built to last almost indefinitely and are typically in service for twenty-five years or more).
146 Bureau of Transp. Stat., 2018 Traffic Data for U.S Airlines and Foreign Airlines
U.S. Flights, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/
2018-traffic-data-us-airlines-and-foreign-airlines-us-flights [https://perma.cc/
M4FM-6KUQ].
147 Id.
148 See ROGER W. COBB & DAVID M. PRIMO, THE PLANE TRUTH: AIRLINE CRASHES,
THE MEDIA, AND TRANSPORTATION POLICY 1 (2003) (“[P]lane crashes receive media coverage disproportionate to their death toll.”).
149 This disclosure should be required under ERISA “even though such disclosure would not be mandated by federal securities laws.” Grosbard, supra note 75,
at 98.
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tive disclosures are required to meet the duty of prudence when
public safety is at stake, as it is clear that delayed corrections
have a negative impact on long-term stock value. Applying this
to Burke, corporate officers knew or should have known about
the aircraft safety defects, which, without earlier disclosure, led
to larger losses and greater decreases in long-term shareholder
value. Courts must look to the underlying business and the
safety implications from the ordinary course of business to
weigh the factors in favor of or against corrective disclosures.
This method aligns with the policy findings of Congress that
“continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents are directly affected by these [benefit]
plans,”150 and Congress has “establish[ed] standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans.”151 While some courts have been reluctant to impose a
duty to disclose on employers,152 these courts did not address all
of the potential contexts and industries that ESOP stock drop
cases may confront. There is no “guess[ing] whether . . . adverse
nonpublic information” would decrease the stock price in contexts of selling a dangerous product153 because it undoubtedly
always does in certain industries like airlines.
Some may argue that deciding how much to disclose is a difficult line to draw and forces an ERISA fiduciary to guess how
much to disclose in certain circumstances. Such arguments directly tie to a prudent fiduciary standard based on the industry
involved. Many courts have found that while a company is conducting an investigation, it may be absolved from some fiduciary
responsibility.154 Theoretically, however, this could always absolve companies from liability when they extend their internal
investigation procedures. By not setting boundaries for courts to
analyze what is prudent in certain contexts, appellate courts
have effectively limited fiduciary duties and put discretion directly in the hands of the employer. Public safety concerns in29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
Id. § 1001(b).
152 See, e.g., Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1285 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“Such a rule would force them to guess whether . . . adverse nonpublic information will affect the price of employer stock, and then would require them to disclose . . . [even] if they believe that the information will have a materially adverse
effect on the value of the investment fund.”).
153 See id.
154 See, e.g., In re HP ERISA Litig., No. 3:12-CV-06199, 2015 WL 3749565, at
*7–8 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2015).
150
151
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herently raise different considerations in ERISA cases, and “the
appropriate inquiry will necessarily be context specific.”155
By dismissing cases before discovery, plaintiffs are left unable
to examine the proposed investigation and see how it affected
the plausibility of alternative actions alleged by the plaintiffs in
these cases. ERISA is meant to set “minimum standards” on employer conduct,156 yet current court decisions allow employers to
choose their own rules even in light of egregious violations. The
Dudenhoeffer alternative pleading standard must align with the
Court’s context-specific directive and consider how different industries are accountable for disregarding clear threats to public
safety that may cause significant stock drops that harm
employees.
B.

DELEGATED FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND
MONITOR

AN

ONGOING DUTY

TO

A more difficult problem in Burke—and the primary reason
for its dismissal—was that Boeing had designated its fiduciary
responsibility to an independent third party.157 ERISA allows a
transfer of investment liability either under ERISA §§ 3(21) or
3(38) investment fiduciaries,158 as it is a practical option for plan
sponsors who may not be investment experts but “are still held
to ERISA’s prudent expert standard.”159 Additionally, regarding
investment selection in retirement plans, the Supreme Court
has utilized trust law to decide that ERISA fiduciaries have an
ongoing responsibility to monitor investments in the benefit
plan even after the initial security selection.160 Boeing appeared
Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 142 S. Ct. 737, 742 (2022).
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
157 See Burke v. Boeing Co., 500 F. Supp. 3d 717, 725 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
158 A § 3(21) investment fiduciary is anyone who “renders investment advice
for a fee or other compensation” but does not have any discretionary control over
the plan assets, thus leaving the plan sponsor with some fiduciary liabilities. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). A § 3(38) investment fiduciary has full “power to manage,
acquire, or dispose of any asset of a plan,” and this may absolve plan sponsors of
fiduciary liability. Id. § 1002(38)(A); Mark J. Grushkin, Understanding Your Fiduciary Liability: 3(21) vs. 3(38) Services, MORGAN STANLEY 4 (May 2019), https://graystone.morganstanley.com/graystone-consulting-portland-or/documents/field/
g/gr/graystone-consulting—-portland—or/understanding-fiduciary-liability-3-21v-3-38.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DP8-T9VA].
159 Grushkin, supra note 158, at 1.
160 “We have often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is ‘derived from the
common law of trusts.’” Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 528 (2015) (quoting
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559,
570 (1985)).
155
156
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to have taken the Section 3(38) investment approach when it
assigned Evercore the “exclusive fiduciary authority and responsibility, in its sole discretion, to determine whether the continuing investment in the [Boeing stock was] prudent under
ERISA.”161
Many consultants and advisors advocate for Section 3(38) fiduciary liability relief as a way to reduce legal action against investment committees that may not be as financially savvy as
other sophisticated companies.162 However, electing to have a
Section 3(38) investment fiduciary should not absolve employers of the ongoing duty to appoint and monitor the investment
managers.163 The Section 3(38) fiduciary only accepts liability
for the fiduciary decisions regarding investments, but they must
be adequately informed of employer stock price risks, particularly when the initial employer stock option choice originated
from an informed executive board.164
Indeed, this presents a much stickier situation for harmed
plaintiffs to plead around. But fiduciaries should not be absolved from responsibility in respect to offering employer stock
simply because they pass the buck on their investment responsibilities to a third party. Courts typically find that when an investment manager is appointed, usually in a Section 3(38) aspect,
this removes any discretionary control of plan assets from the
plan sponsor, and, thus, the plan sponsor is not a fiduciary—
neither in a named or functional aspect.165 One federal court
held that “ ‘nothing in ERISA itself or in traditional principles of

Burke, 500 F. Supp. 3d at 725.
See, e.g., Grushkin, supra note 158, at 7; cf. David Griffin, 3(16), 3(21) and
3(38) Fiduciaries: What’s the Difference?, LINKEDIN (June 13, 2019), https://
www.linkedin.com/pulse/316-321-338-fiduciaries-whats-difference-david-griffinaif-c-k-p-/ [https://perma.cc/84MT-KBWM] (“Unlike a 3(21), a 3(38) bears the
investment risk. Therefore, this arrangement alleviates much of your liability pertaining to the plan’s investments.”).
163 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3) (noting that any employee benefit plan may
provide for a named fiduciary who may, in turn, appoint an investment manager), with Griffin, supra note 162 (noting the employer’s liability is narrowed to
the selection and monitoring of the fiduciary).
164 See, e.g., In re SunTrust Banks, Inc. ERISA Litig., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1379–80 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
165 See generally, e.g., In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-CV-4214, 2015 WL
6674576, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2015).
161
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trust law’ imposes . . . a duty [to keep appointees apprised of
material, nonpublic information].”166
Plaintiffs have attempted to get around the obstacle of plan
sponsors delegating their authority to independent third-party
fiduciaries by “alleging novel duty-to-monitor claims.”167 Remy
Grosbard points out in her Note that one court has found that
“[t]he duty to keep appointees informed has gained reasonably
wide acceptance as an inherent facet of the more general ‘duty
to monitor.’ ”168 The Supreme Court strengthened the duty to
monitor to an ongoing duty to monitor investment selection in
Tibble v. Edison International.169 This conflict between courts
shows the differences in how far a duty to inform will go and is
likely to persist until further judicial or congressional
intervention.
It appears to be contrary to the stated purpose of Congress in
promulgating ERISA—to promote the stability of employment
and provide for the general welfare170—that companies could
(1) know or should know the company is committing safety violations; (2) know that due to these issues, the company stock is
overvalued; (3) continue to promote that stock as a prudent investment option to employees; (4) fail to provide any disclosure
about the danger to the public; (5) cause harm to the public
and have a stock decline; and (6) fail to face any repercussions
as a prudent monitor of their investment appointees.171 This approach puts employees at a disadvantage when they are more
likely (due to limited investment options in benefit plans)172 or
required (as in some ESOPs)173 to invest in employer stock.
The initial decision to offer company stock starts with the employer, and indeed in the Burke case, the executive team cannot
166 Id. at *9 (quoting In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 113 F. Supp. 3d
745, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)); see 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75–8 (outlining the ongoing fiduciary duties of a fiduciary who has appointed trustees or other fiduciaries).
167 Grosbard, supra note 75, at 102.
168 Id. at 103 (quoting Woods. v. S. Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1373 (N.D. Ga.
2005)).
169 575 U.S. 523, 530 (2015).
170 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
171 See, e.g., Burke v. Boeing Co., 500 F. Supp. 3d 717 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
172 E.g., Kailey Hagen, Can You Invest Your 401(k) in Individual Stocks?, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (May 17, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.fool.com/retirement/
2019/05/17/can-you-invest-your-401k-in-individual-stocks.aspx [https://
perma.cc/882J-8W4A].
173 E.g., Are ESOP Accounts Required to Be Fully Invested in Company Stock?, SES
ESOP STRATEGIES, https://sesesop.com/esop-accounts-required-fully-investedcompany-stock/ [https://perma.cc/2AGE-QF3A].
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“pass the buck” by appointing a Section 3(38) advisor when its
team made the original decision to include employer stock.
Many advisors proclaim that single name stocks are a particularly risky investment unsuited for retirement plans,174 and informed executives typically participate in decisions to include
company stock.175 As noted, Congress has explicitly stated that it
wants to promote employee ownership of employer stock,176 but
this only relieves fiduciaries of the duty to diversify. And this policy initiative surely cannot override the public’s interest in
safety.
In essence, if an employer knows that it is committing egregious violations that could result in deaths of citizens, impending lawsuits, and numerous civil settlements or criminal
sanctions,177 no prudent employer could decide that taking alternative actions such as corrective disclosure would do more
harm than good to firm value. Tort litigation in certain areas is
certainly a high risk to investors and a high risk to employer
stock value, along with other U.S. Security and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 damages.178 Congressional intent to increase
stock ownership must be balanced with its desire to secure retirement income and stability for employees. It is absurd to absolve employers of their duty to monitor their appointed
investment advisors when they know a stock choice is inherently
overvalued and runs serious risks to public safety—and therefore risks massive declines in the wealth of its employees. Employers have a continuing duty to monitor and ensure their
174 See, e.g., Dennis Hartman, Can I Choose Individual Stocks in My 401(k)?, ZACKS,
https://finance.zacks.com/can-choose-individual-stocks-401k-1308.html [https:/
/perma.cc/25AF-4TKF] (Jan. 28, 2019).
175 See, e.g., SAM ASPINWALL, EXECUTIVE CONSULTING OF RAYMOND JAMES, CONCENTRATIONS IN EMPLOYER STOCK 2, https://www.raymondjames.com/-/media/
rj/advisor-sites/sites/e/x/executiveconsulting/files/concentrated_equity_discussion_paper_ecofrj.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJL3-YC8C] (“Often times,
a corporate executive’s financial well-being is tied to their employer. This link is
typically best seen through a concentration in employer stock. . . Executives need
to thoroughly understand this risk and incorporate their employer concentration
into their broader, long-term financial plan.”).
176 Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420 (2014).
177 See, e.g., David Schaper, Boeing to Pay $2.5 Billion Settlement Over Deadly 737
Max Crashes, NPR (Jan. 8, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/08/
954782512/boeing-to-pay-2-5-billion-settlement-over-deadly-737-max-crashes
[https://perma.cc/R56C-LBF9].
178 See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 8 (1994).
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investment advisors are informed of material information that
could affect their investment decisions.179
In Burke, Boeing appointed the third-party investment fiduciary was on August 9, 2017.180 But Boeing has offered employer
stock since at least 1996,181 and designing a plane takes years.182
Boeing was alleged to have been on notice of 737 MAX issues
since at least 2009183 and had performed flights of the 737 MAX
since January 2016.184 This demonstrates that Boeing should
have been aware that its defective design would adversely affect
stock price before a third-party investment fiduciary appointment. Under the continuing duty to monitor investments,185
courts should look to the context of the investment decisions
made and reconcile whether the continual duty to monitor ends
at the very moment a third-party investment fiduciary is appointed.
Because the context here differs from other stock drop cases, so
too should the duty to monitor investment fiduciaries for entities involving public safety.
Courts have been split on how to treat this duty to inform (or
“monitor”) appointed fiduciaries. Some have found that employers can be liable when they “issue false and misleading statements regarding [product] safety, efficacy, and profitability, in
order to artificially inflate the value of [the Company’s]
stock.”186 Other courts have been more hesitant “to unequivocally endorse the duty to inform [but] have found it inappropriate to dismiss such a claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”187 And
finally, some courts have completely found that “ERISA does not
impose a duty on appointing fiduciaries to keep their appoinSee Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 530 (2015).
Burke v. Boeing Co., 500 F. Supp. 3d 717, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
181 Boeing Setting Up Employee Stock Fund, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 1996, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-07-12-fi-23307-story.html
[https://perma.cc/58E4-EQ55].
182 Yuvraj Domun, Aircraft Design Process Overview, ENGINEERING CLICKS (Nov.
24, 2016), https://www.engineeringclicks.com/aircraft-design-process/ [https://
perma.cc/GZN5-55EL].
183 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 23, at 15.
184 See id. at 19.
185 See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 529 (2015).
186 In re Pfizer Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 04 Civ. 10071, 2009 WL 749545, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2009).
187 Woods v. S. Co., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (noting that
other courts have found that some duty to monitor exists but will not decide how
far the duty extends without a developed factual record).
179
180
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tees apprised of nonpublic information.”188 The Supreme Court
should intervene to define this duty to monitor clearly. In doing
so, it should require courts to look at the underlying harm alleged and the effects on the broader community that a prudent
fiduciary would have been confronted with.
At the very least, employers who affect public safety, like those
in Murray and Burke, should be required to make corrective disclosures to ensure their duty of prudence is being met. The
presence of this factor must be considered and pleaded during
an alternative action claim so long as the employer is not violating securities laws.189 Employers who deal in public goods and
services should be held to this higher standard of duty to inform
as a matter of public policy.
C.

FIDUCIARY PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE

TO

PLAN PROVIDERS

One wrinkle in the analysis is time—or how long employers
should be allowed to wait before making disclosures once they
find their good or service threatens public safety. The critical
issue is determining when an entity should be required to make
disclosures or restrict stock purchases in employer benefit plans
during the investigation. The answer is a bit unclear and needs
to be addressed by professional standards of conduct. Boeing
currently outlines its safety standards and processes, which the
Federal Aviation Administration regulates.190 This is similar to
the case in Murray, where the FDA set safety standards of conduct through its regulation of medical devices.191 These decisions on timing should be reviewed by professional standards
and how reasonable it was for the company to conclude it was
prudent not to make disclosures.
In Burke, numerous engineers had significant safety concerns
even before the launch of the 737 MAX line.192 While courts
have rejected the economic theory that a delayed report causes
more monetary damages,193 the impact of hazards to public
188 In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 113 F. Supp. 3d 745, 765 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
189 Grosbard focuses on when the duty to inform complies with existing disclosure rules in securities laws and advises courts to refrain from making a “per se
rule against the duty to inform.” Grosbard, supra note 75, at 113–14.
190 See FAA Updates on Boeing 737 MAX: FAA Statement on Updates to the FSB Report
and MMEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.faa.gov/news/
updates/?newsId=93206 [https://perma.cc/GG84-VHWJ].
191 Murray v. Invacare Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d 660, 663–64 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
192 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
193 E.g., Loeza v. John Does 1–10, 659 F. App’x 44, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2016).
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health is unique and should be reviewed at a level of how egregious the violation was and how reasonable it was to conceal.
Courts should conduct the alternative action requirement
under Dudenhoeffer through this lens, holding the employer to
prudence specific to the underlying context and not applying
the same analysis to every employer in every industry. Regardless
of the presence of an appointed investment fiduciary, employers
have a duty to ensure that their investments are prudent, and
they must monitor their actions when appointing and keeping
these fiduciaries informed. Employers should be required to
make corrective disclosures in special circumstances when there
are clear health and safety implications for the public at large.
Employers may be concerned about meeting this standard,
such as how much and when to disclose or inform. However,
executives should understand the intricacies of their businesses
and be informed by their technical knowledge of the entity’s
operations, including safety risks and their impacts on the overall business. In some jurisdictions and contexts, courts “recognize[ ] that the nature and extent of reasonable care depend[s]
upon the type of corporation, its size and financial resources.”194
District courts analyzing stock drop cases should employ this
similar requirement when looking at the prudence of an employer’s actions when that employer fails to take any action and
causes stock price harm.
This standard would apply differently to various industries
and review how executives of entities convey information to the
public. By tying this standard in with a duty to inform, employers would have adequate notice that they must inform their appointed fiduciaries of major health risks and be required to
protect their employees from taking the brunt of their questionable management decisions. Because of the risks to public
health, limited investments in retirement plans, and the purposes outlined in ERISA,195 employees of airlines and other
manufacturing industries should have more protections when
they allege severe negligence by their employers.

194 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–22 (N.J. 1981) (referring
to the requirement of being knowledgeable of firm financial statements as a
member of the Board).
195 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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CONCLUSION

Ultimately, courts should consider more factors in their alternative action analysis under the Dudenhoeffer standard. Where
the potential harm is more unclear—as in cases regarding accounting fraud, risky investing, or uncertain improper activities—plaintiffs must carefully craft their pleadings to make a
plausible claim that a prudent fiduciary would find restricting
stock purchases or making a corrective disclosure would not do
more harm than good. However, certain industries, like aviation, demand a different, context-specific Dudenhoeffer lens because public safety is a major factor, and both public interest in
health and congressional interests in employee stability should
tip the scales in favor of plaintiffs who can show that the employer knew or should have known about potential hazards to
public well-being. When these perils are present, it becomes
more difficult for defendants to assert that it would have “done
more harm than good” to long-term stock value not to issue corrective disclosures or recall their defective products.
Employers could continue to be more proactive in monitoring discretionary investment advisors and decisions to include
company stock. By no means is this Comment meant to discourage companies from offering employee stock—it should be construed as cautious advice to those industries that are more
deeply entrenched in the public realm and who are negligent in
their approaches to correcting issues harming their employees’
long-term retirement stability. Based on Dudenhoeffer, courts
should not create blanket rules for all industries, as a duty to
disclose or inform appointed investment managers is in the public interest. ERISA protects employees when their employers act
imprudently. As average Americans are now falling severely
short of retirement security,196 it is imperative to ensure some
employees who have invested in employer stock are not being
left without retirement savings.
196 Retirement Throughout the Ages: Expectations and Preparations of American Workers, TRANSAMERICA CTR. FOR RET. STUD. 46 (May 2015), https://www.transamerica
center.org/docs/default-source/resources/center-research/16th-annual/tcrs
2015_sr_retirement_throughout_the_ages.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6WJ-VK9W]
(noting that only nineteen percent of those surveyed in their sixties or older were
“very confident” they would be able to fully retire with a comfortable lifestyle).

